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DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE UNDER SECTION 302(b)(1)
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954—
THE RELEVANCE OF THE NECESSARY
BUSINESS TRANSACTION
A distribution out of earnings and profits by a corporation to its share-
holders inenerally in the form of a dividend, and results in ordinary income
taxation to the shareholder.' Occasionally, however, a corporation distributes
earnings and profits as part of a redemption of its stock. The question then
arises whether such a distribution is in essence a dividend or a valid arm's-
length transaction. If the former, the distribution would receive ordinary
income treatment, regardless of its form. If the latter, it would be taxable
as a payment in exchange for a capital asset . 3 It is essential that this dis-
tinction be made, since a distribution by a corporation to its shareholders
is not taxable as a dividend to the extent that it represents a return of
capital investment.3
 In enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress
recognized that some guidelines were needed for this determination of the
tax consequences to a shareholder of a distribution in redemption of stock.
These guidelines are set forth in section 302 of the Code.4
Section 302(a) provides that a stock redemption shall be treated as a
return of capital if certain conditions are met. 3 These conditions, under which
the distribution to the shareholder receives capital gain treatment, are
enumerated in section 302(b). 6 Subsection 302(b) (1) provides that a re-
demption "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" will qualify for capital
gain treatment?' The application of this subsection presents a difficult factual
question in which all facts and circumstances of the transaction are con-
sidered to determine whether the redemption is essentially equivalent to a
dividend. Consequently, a taxpayer relying on this subsection cannot be
certain that his particular redemption will meet the requirements of this
condition. The other three conditions are readily identifiable, and can be
mechanically applied to any given stock redemption. Section 302 (b) (2) per-
mits capital gain treatment of a redemption which is "substantially dispro-
portionate with respect to the shareholder." 8 A redemption is "substantially
disproportionate" within the meaning of the section if, immediately after
the redemption, (1) the ratio of voting stock, and any common stock, owned
by the shareholder, to all such stock of the corporation is less than 80 percent
of such ratio at the time of the redemption, and (2) the shareholder owns less
than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock.
A redemption of all stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder is
I Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a) (7).
2 Id. §§ 1201, 1221.
3 See Jones v. Dawson, 148 F.2d 87, 91 (10th Cir. 1945).
4 milt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302.
5 Id. § 302(a).
6 Id. § 302(b).
7 Id. § 302(b) (1).
8 Id. § 302 (b) (2) .
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treated as a distribution in exchange for the stock by section 302(b) (3).'`
Section 302(b) (4) provides that section 302(a) shall be applicable to
redemptions of stock issued by a railroad corporation pursuant to a plan of
reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act."
The predecessor of section 302(b) contained only the language of the
first of these conditions, allowing capital gain treatment for distributions in
redemption made "at such time and in such manner" as not to be "essentially
equivalent to a dividend.""- It had been judicially established, and was
generally accepted, that no single determinative test for dividend equivalence
could be articulated, and that disposition of each case should depend on a
factual inquiry into all aspects of the transaction. 12
 As a result of this
individual treatment, the administration of this dividend equivalence test
produced confusion both among courts applying the standard and among tax-
payers seeking to determine whether distributions to them were taxable as
capital gain or as ordinary income.
In response to this problem, section 302 of the 1954 Code, as passed
originally by the House, contained only the three provisions which are now
sections 302(b) (2), (3) and (4)." By passing only these "safe harbor"
provisions, the House intended to substitute for the 1939 standard a detailed
legislative scheme which would permit redemption transactions to be planned
with certainty as to their tax consequences."
The Senate, in passing on the bill, concluded that certainty was not to
be achieved at the expense of "legislative flexibility."" Detailed rules
enacted to achieve almost mathematical certainty, the Senate Report stated,
"would make it difficult for necessary business transactions to be carried out
with a minimum degree of interference from the tax laws." 18 Finding the
"safe harbor" provisions unnecessarily restrictive, "particularly, in the case
of redemptions of preferred stock which might be called by the corporation
without the shareholder having any control over when the redemption may
take place," 17 the Senate reinstated the test of dividend equivalence in
section 302 (b) ( 1 ) . This section enacts a degree of flexibility by allowing
capital gain treatment for any redemption found to be a bona fide sale or ex-
change of stock, notwithstanding that the redemption fails to meet the
specific requirements of sections 302(b) (2), (3) and (4).
In appending section 302 (b) ( 1 ) to the House bill, it was the general
intention of the Senate to incorporate the pre-1954 test as to whether a re-
demption is essentially equivalent to a dividend." After adopting this test in
i) Id. § 302 (b) (3)
10 Id. § 302(b) (4).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48.
12 Flanagan v. Helvering,' 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1936). See Golden, The Dividend Equivalence
Test: Forty Years of Confusion, 43 Texas L. Rev. 755, 759 (1965).
13 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1954).
14 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954).
15 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
16 Id. at 42.
17 Id. at 44.
18 Id, at 233.
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general, however, the Senate continued to qualify this incorporation and to
make more explicit its intention for future application: "Your committee
further intends that in applying this test for the future that the inquiry
will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not the transaction by
its nature may be properly characterized as a sale of stock by the redeeming
shareholder to the corporation."19
 The significance of this statement of
proper emphasis and direction of inquiry is not immediately clear. It would
seem, however, to indicate an intention that any redemption which, in view
of all the relevant facts and circumstances, may properly be characterized
as an arm's-length transaction should be deemed an exchange and taxed at
capital gain rates. In determining the character of a redemption, courts
should consider only factors relevant to the question of whether the redemp-
tion was a valid sale. Looking at the effect of the redemption on the share-
holder, the court should inquire whether he relinquished some significant
part of his interest in the corporation, thereby transferring adequate con-
sideration in exchange for the distribution to him; considering the effect on
the corporation, the inquiry should be whether the redemption was dictated
by the exigencies of the corporation's business, indicating that the corpora-
tion received some bargained-for advantage in return for the distribution
by it to the shareholder.
The Senate Committee's directive for future consideration of dividend
equivalence has been almost entirely ignored and only its general intention
of reinstating the pre-1954 test has been given effect. 2° As a result, while
sections 302(b) (2), (3) and (4), the "safe harbor" provisions, have intro-
duced a measure of certainty, what has been incorporated into the 1954
Code in section 302(b) (1) is the element of confusion which the House bill
was drafted to eliminate.
The confusion involved in the application of the dividend equivalence
test resulted from judicial development of numerous factors in the test and
the failure to distinguish between the truly significant criteria and those which
were merely makeweight arguments and incidental factors. 2 ' Recognizing this
problem, Congress sought to eliminate the following as criteria in the deter-
mination of dividend equivalence under section 302(b) (1) of the 1954
Code:
(1) The redemption was not made by the corporation pursuant to any
adopted plan or policy of contraction of business activities, nor was it
followed by an orderly procedure looking toward the ultimate dissolution
of the corporation or a contraction of its operation. 22
(2) The corporation continued to operate at a profit after the redemption. 23
(3) There was a sufficient accumulation of earnings and profits to fund
the distribution.24
13 Id. at 234.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1961).
21 Moore, Dividend Equivalency—Taxation of Distributions in Redemption of
Stock, 19 Tax L. Rev. 249, 250-52 (1964).
22 McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1936).
23 Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 73, 74 (3d Cir. 1935).
24 William H. Grimditch, 37 B.TA. 402, 411 (1938).
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Despite this attempt on the part of Congress at clarification, courts continue
to place reliance on these three criteria.25
As to the other criteria, Congress made no specification, but by generally
adopting the pre-1954 test, it impliedly endorsed them. Several of these are
of questionable relevance to the consideration of dividend equivalence. They
are:
(4) The redemption was made pursuant to a motive or scheme of tax avoid-
ance."
(5) The amounts, frequency and significance of past dividends were
negligible."
(6) The initiative for the corporate redemption came from the shareholder
for his own purposes, rather than from the corporation based on usual
business considerations."
There are three further criteria in the dividend equivalence test:
(7) There was no legitimate business purpose for the redemption, or the
business purpose asserted was not sufficiently compelling to overcome the
other indicia of dividend equivalence."
(8) The distribution was made prorata."
(9) The proportionate ownership and/or control of the shareholders was not
materially altered. 3 '
It is submitted that these are the only relevant factors and are essential
to the consideration of dividend equivalence.
It will be the purpose of this comment to discuss, in general, the
relevance of each of the criteria, and, in particular, the significance of involve-
ment of the redemption in a necessary business transaction as a fundamental
factor in the dividend equivalence test.
I. FACTORS DISMISSED FROM THE CONSIDERATION OF DIVIDEND
EQUIVALENCE
Under pre-1954 tax law, any genuine contraction of the corporation's
business was deemed to indicate that the redemption was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend 1 2 As both redemptions and partial liquidations were
treated under the same section of the 1939 Code, corporate contraction was
a valid consideration in the dividend equivalence test under that statute."
In 1954, however, Congress separated "into their significant elements the
kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated in the definition of a partial
25 See Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119, 126 (9th Cir. 1957).
26 J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866, 873 (1937).
27 Id. at 875.
28 Cf. Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206, 211 (1940).
29 Cf. H.F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878, 883 (1937).
30 Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1934).
31 See Commissioner v. Ahlborn, 77 F.2d 700, 701 (3d Cir. 1935) (dissent).
32 Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836, 841 (1948).
33 Int.. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 115(c), (g), 53 Stat. 46-48.
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liquidation."34
 To this end Congress enacted section 346 which defines a
partial liquidation as follows:
(a) In General.—For purposes of this subchapter, a distribu-
tion shall be treated as in partial liquidation of a corporation if—
(1) the distribution is one of a series of distributions in
redemption of all the stock of the corporation pursuant to a
plan; or
(2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend, is in redemption of a part of the stock of the
corporation pursuant to a plan, and occurs within the taxable
year in which the plan is adopted or within the succeeding tax-
able year. . . .35
Section 331 provides that amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a
corporation, as defined in section 346, shall be treated as in part or full pay-
ment in exchange for the stock 38 It was the intention of the Senate that
any "corporate contraction" as the concept had developed under the existing
law would result in a partial liquidation. 37 By thus isolating the factor of
corporate contraction to section 346, the Senate expressly severed this
criterion from the determination of dividend equivalence under section
302 (b) (1).
Continued operation at a profit, the second of the criteria mentioned
above which courts have viewed as indicative of dividend equivalence,
developed in connection with, and as a converse of, corporate contraction.
The reasoning of courts which employed this criterion appears to he that a
business which continues to operate at a profit after the redemption evidences
expansion rather than contraction. As a concomitant of the corporate contrac-
tion factor, continued operation at a profit is presumed to have been likewise
severed from a consideration of section 302 dividend equivalence." It is
submitted that, in any case, this factor is totally irrelevant since neither a
contraction of the corporation's business nor a declared dividend eliminates
the possibility of future profits. Moreover, the introduction of this factor
into the dividend equivalence test is at best questionable since, in the case in
which it was first invoked, the criterion was interjected almost as an after-
thought concluding a long list of facts strongly indicative of dividend
equivalence." In no subsequent case has there been found any rationale
for its inclusion as a factor for consideration.° In view of its probable isolation
34 S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 15, at 49.
35 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 346(a).
36 Id. § 331.
37 S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 15, at 262.
38 In every case found in which this factor has been invoked, it has been coupled
with the corporate contraction factor. See, e.g., cases cited note 40 infra,
39 Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 73, 74 (3d Cir. 1935). Other factors enumerated
were: the money with which the corporation purchased the stock came from earnings
and profits; after the redemption the shareholder owned 98% of the corporation's stock
as compared with 99% prior to the redemption; there was no liquidation of the business;
the amount of capital stock was increased.
40 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1966); Earle
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into section 346 and its general irrelevance, continued operation at a profit
should be disregarded in determining whether a redemption of stock is essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend for purposes of section 302 (b) (1).
Distributions by a corporation are taxable dividends only insofar as
they are derived from earnings and profits. 41
 The Code itself defines a
dividend as a distribution out of earnings and profits. 42
 The significance to
the dividend equivalence test of corporate earnings and profits, then, lies in
the fact that their existence is a prerequisite to any consideration of dividend
equivalence. Under the 1939 Code, however, courts extended this significance
by invoking the existence of earnings and profits as positive evidence that
the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend." As with the con-
sideration of continued operation at a profit, there has been found no rationale
expressed to justify reliance on this as a criterion. 44 To assure that this
factor would not be given additional force as an independent test, the
Senate expressly disclaimed the existence of earnings and profits as a criterion
to be weighed in determining dividend equivalence. After instructing that,
under the 1954 Code, inquiry should be devoted solely to the question of
whether or not the transaction by its nature may be properly characterized
as a sale, the Senate Report stated that "for this purpose the presence or
absence of earnings and profits of the corporation is not material." 45
II. FACTORS OF QUESTIONABLE RELEVANCE TO THE CONSIDERATION
OF DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE
The provisions of section 302 are designed to permit the return of a
capital investment to be taxed at capital gain rates, while at the same time
preventing tax avoidance in the form of distributions formally in redemption
of stock, but substantially corporate dividends. Accordingly, presence or
absence of a scheme or motive of circumventing the tax law has often been
referred to as a criterion in the determination of dividend equivalence."
This criterion is, however, a false one, and most courts refuse to consider
it.47 Dismissal of the question of motive from the consideration of dividend
equivalence is appropriate since it is with the essence of the distribution,
i.e., whether a sale or exchange, that section 302 (b) (I) is concerned, and
not with the motive of those who initiated it. Moreover, a financial transac-
tion, otherwise eligible for a certain tax treatment, is not disqualified from
the tax advantage by the mere fact that it was entered into with the intention
of reducing tax liability."
v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119, 127 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937,
939 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
41 See Jones v. Dawson, 148 F.2d 87, 91 (10th Cir. 1945).
42 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 316.
43 See, e.g., William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402, 411 (1938).
44 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1966) ;
Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 1962) ; Ferro v. Commissioner,
242 F.2d 838, 842 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Genevra Heman, 32 T.C. 479, 488 (1959), aff'd, 283
F.2d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1960).
48 S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 15, at 234.
48 See, e.g., J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866, 873 (1937).
47 See, e.g., Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
48 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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Dividend history of the corporation is a frequently invoked criterion
in determining dividend equivalence. 49
 A meager or nonexistent dividend
policy, or the discontinuance or reduction of payments under an established
dividend policy have been found to indicate that the redemption was essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend." The basis of such a view is that the re-
demption was merely a disguise for dividends which had been previously
suppressed. On the other hand, a regular dividend policy has been considered
evidence that the redemption was not in fact another dividend, on the ap-
parent ground that, because dividends had been paid according to a sys-
tematic, orderly policy, an extraordinary payment from earnings and profits
is not indicative of a substitution for a dividend!".
It is difficult to formulate a rationale for the application of this criterion.
A scanty or nonexistent dividend policy does perhaps evidence the existence
of earnings and profits sufficient to fund the redemption, a factor which has
been declared by the Senate to be immaterial to the determination of section
302 (b) (1) dividend equivalence. Moreover, such a dividend policy may also
indicate a motive of tax avoidance, i.e., an intent to have earnings and profits
dispersed in a form which would escape ordinary income taxation. Likewise,
while a regular dividend history may indicate lack of a tax avoidance
motive, it is equally susceptible of the interpretation that the shareholders
had tired of paying taxes on their dividends at ordinary income rates and
had determined to withdraw some of their accumulated earnings and
profits in another form. As noted above, however, a motive of tax avoidance
is per se immaterial to the consideration of dividend equivalence. Finally,
an extraordinary distribution of earnings and profits by a company with a
consistent dividend history may indicate that the redemption was made
pursuant to a legitimate business purpose which has been held indicative of
nonequivalence. It does not, however, establish such a legitimate business
purpose and no weight should be given the mere inference which may arise
from a regular dividend policy. Dividend history should have no bearing
on the court's determination that the distribution in redemption of stock was
or was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Whether the initiative for the distribution came from the shareholder for
his own purposes, or from the corporation based upon usual business considera-
tions, has often been mentioned as an individual criterion by the courts. 52
This inquiry has been interpreted by some to be only a particular consider-
ation in the general inquiry into motivation." At any rate, no rationale has
43 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Earle
v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119, 127-28 (9th Cir. 1957); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d
937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C. 723, 730 (1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 225,
231 (9th Cir. 1964); Genevra Heman, 32 T.C. 479, 487 (1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 227, 231
(8th Cir. 1960).
60 See cases cited note 49 supra.
51 Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950, 956 (1961).
52 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1962) ; Ferro
v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838, 842 (3d Cir. 1957); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d
937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C. 723, 730 (1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 225,
231 (9th Cir. 1964).
53 See, e.g., Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1962). See also
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been expressed to justify its existence as an individual criterion, 54
 and it is
submitted that the source of initiative for the redemption has no validity as
such. Source of initiative may be significant, however, in its bearing on the
court's inquiry into another aspect of the transaction. Where initiative has
come from the shareholder, courts have been reluctant to find the existence
of a legitimate business purpose for the redemption. 55
The existence of a legitimate business purpose has likewise been dismissed
by at least one court as bearing only upon the irrelevant issue of tax avoid-
ance." It is submitted that while the presence of a legitimate business purpose
is immaterial insofar as it evidences lack of tax avoidance motive, it is of
considerable import as indicative of the fact that the motivation of the corpo-
ration in redeeming its stock was to effect a necessary business transaction.
It will be the major contention of this comment that this is precisely the
situation to which section 302 (b) (1) was meant to apply.
'III. FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONSIDERATION OF DIVIDEND EqUIVALENCE
A. 4Prorata Character of the Distribution, and Significant Modification of
Proportionate Ownership and/or Control
Before considering the involvement of the redemption in a necessary
business transaction, the factors of prorata nature of the redemption, and if
it is not prorata, the failure of the redemption to alter significantly the pro-
portionate ownership of the shareholders must be examined. A dividend is a
distribution of cash or other assets out of earnings and profits which does not
alter the legal ownership or control of the corporation. 57 Since a prorata distri-
bution and one not prorata which does not significantly alter the shareholder's
interest in the corporation are like dividends in this regard, these two factors
are of paramount significance as evidence of dividend equivalence. 58 In their
treatment of the prorata character of a distribution, courts have avoided the
conclusion that it is determinative," and the Treasury rejects any such con-
clusive presumption by stating in the Regulations that a prorata distribution
will generally be essentially equivalent to a dividend." Nevertheless, examina-
tion of the cases reveals that meaningful alteration of shareholder interests is
the most important factor in the determination" and is generally controlling. 02
Mickey & Hoiden, Distributions Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend—Understanding
the Equation, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 32, 39 (1964).
54 See, e.g., cases cited note 52 supra.
55 Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Ferro v. Commissioner,
242 F.2d 838, 842 (3d Cir. 1957).
58 Northrup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1957). See Golden, supra
note 12, at 763-64; Mickey & Holden, supra note 53, at 38.
57 See In re Luken's Estate, 246 F.2d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1957).
58 See Mickey & Holden, supra note 53, at 40. See generally Moore, supra note 21.
59 See, e.g., Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2 (1955).
81 See Mickey & Holden, supra note 53, at 40; Moore, supra note 21, at 252.
92 To ascertain the change in percentage of ownership, the ratio of holdings after
the redemption is compared with the ratio of holdings prior to the redemption. Thus,
if the holder of 50% of the stock of a corporation redeems 20% of his stock, i.e., 10% of
the total stock of the corporation, and this is the sole_ redemption, his holdings after
the redemption are not 40%, but rather 44.44%, not 80% of his prior ownings, but
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It should be noted that correct construction of the significant-alteration
test requires consideration of the total transaction or series of transactions
resulting in a change of ownership, and not of the redemption as an isolated
activity." A redemption coupled with a later sale of the redeemed stock by
the corporation, or with a sale of unredeemed stock by the shareholder, may
effect a radical change in proportionate ownership of the shareholder which
would not have resulted from the redemption alone. Likewise, a series of re-
demptions pursuant to a plan may produce the required alteration of owner-
ship and/or control. In considering the total financial transaction, the courts
require a degree of proximity between the related transfers and the redemp-
tion in question. The serial redemptions must be obvious steps in a definite
plan for alteration of proportionate hoIdings.64
 The sales to third parties must
be reasonably related to the redemption; in one case, a plan was held not to
qualify for consideration under the test because it was to extend over an
indefinite period of time; 65
 in another, a plan which was not contemplated
until the year following the redemption was held insufficient to remove the
distribution from the category of those essentially equivalent to a divideRd."
For purposes of the inquiry into modification of shareholder's interests under
section 302 (b) (1), it is immaterial whether the sale to the third party pre-
ceded or followed the redemption.° 7
To receive capital gain treatment on the basis of change in proportionate
ownership, the shareholder must establish that, on this sole ground, the
distribution to him is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Just what he
must show to prove this is not clear. As passed by the House, what is now
section 302 (b) (2) provided that any payment for a redemption which reduced
the shareholder's ratio of stock ownership by more than 20 percent would be
treated as a capital gain to the shareholder." The Senate amended the subsec-
tion by inserting the requirement that after the redemption the shareholder
own less than 50 percent of the total voting power of the corporation to insure
that redemptions satisfying the House's requirement would not receive
capital gain treatment on the basis of change in legal ownership alone if the
shareholder retained control of the corporation." At the same time, the
Senate liberalized the section by reintroducing the dividend equivalence test
of section 302 (b) (1)," These two amendments must be reconciled for a
proper understanding of change of ownership as it affects dividend equiva-
lence. It is generally accepted that a redemption which is significantly dis-
proportionate with respect to the shareholder may qualify as disproportionate
88.88%. See 1 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 9.105 (rev. ed. 1962). It
should be noted that in determining ownership the attribution rules of § 318 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are applicable.
63
 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 538 (8th Cir. 1961); Bains v.
United States, 289 F.2d 644, 647 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
64
 See Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
85
 Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1965).
68
 Tabery v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 1965).
67 1 J. Mertens, supra note 62, § 9.104.
88
 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1954).
69
 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
70
 Id. at 233.
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under section 302 (b) (1), even though it is not "substantially" so within the
meaning of section 302 (b) (2). 71
 The conclusion seems valid, in view of the
case law, that however great the reduction in proportionate ownership, relin-
quishment of actual control will always be required of one who held 50
percent or more of the total combined voting power prior to the redemption,
if he is seeking capital gain treatment on the basis of change in shareholder
interest alone. 72
 A redemption will therefore be treated as an exchange for
purposes of section 302 (b) (1) if the shareholder relinquishes some significant
portion of his investment interest in the corporation, although his ultimate
ownings exceed the reduction requirement of section 302 (b) (2), and if, after
the redemption, he does not retain actual control over 50 percent or more of
the stock of the corporation.
B. The Necessary Business Transaction
A redemption which may not properly be characterized as a sale from the
shareholder's point of view, on the basis of significant alteration of shareholder
interests alone, may still qualify as a valid sale or exchange when viewed
from the side of the other party to the transaction, i.e., if an important cor-
porate purpose is served by the redemption. Inquiry into the existence of a
necessary business transaction, it is submitted, is consistent with the pur-
poses expressed by the Senate in amending the House bill and should be made
in every case in which the alteration of shareholder interests is not sufficient
to indicate nonequivalence. In its general explanation of changes in provi-
sions relating to taxation of corporate distributions, the Senate Committee
stated that necessary business transactions should encounter minimum inter-
ference from the tax law." The desire to protect the shareholder whose stock
might be called without his having control over the time of the redemption
prompted the Senate's only specific indication of how section 302 (b) (1) was
to be applied.74 It is submitted that a redemption dictated by the exigencies
of the business is one instance of such a "forced sale" and should receive capi-
tal gain treatment under section 302 (b) (1).
Two problems arise in connection with this secondary, qualifying crite-
rion. First, the corporate purpose must be clearly distinguishable from the
taxpayer's interest. The following corporate purposes have been recognized as
sufficient to satisfy the necessary business transaction criterion: improvement
of the corporation's credit rating,75 acquisition of new capital by the corpora-
71 D .
 Herwitz, Business Planning 479 (1966). See generally Moore, supra note 21,
at 254. But see Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations,
44 Cornell L.Q. 299, 323 (1959).
72 Compare Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), which recognized as not essentially
equivalent to a dividend a redemption of approximately 7% where the taxpayer re-
linquished actual control, with Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965),
which held a 7% redemption insufficient to qualify for nondividend equivalence where the
shareholder retained actual control. It should be noted that the attribution rules of
§ 318 relate only to ownership, and arc not carried over to the consideration of actual
control. Arthur H. Squier, supra at 955-56.
73 S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 69, at 42.
74 Id. at 44. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
75 See, e.g., Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Keefe v. Cot;
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tion,7° and satisfying the demands of employees for participation in a stock
ownership program. 77
 On the other hand, asserted reasons which have been
deemed to serve primarily shareholder interests include cancellation of a debt
of the shareholder or his estate," and the liquidation or contraction of the
shareholder's ownings of a particular stock of the corporation." A redemption
may fail to qualify for capital gain treatment on this basis notwithstanding
some business advantage to the corporation, if that advantage was not suffi-
ciently important." The problem of distinguishing between the interests of
the shareholder and those of the corporation becomes particularly acute in the
case of a sole shareholder or a holder of a significant majority of the stock.
In such cases courts have been reluctant to find the requisite dichotomy of
interests; 81
 at least one court has stated that recommendations of a stock
redemption by the business, legal, and tax advisors of the corporation, and
by the bank handling its finances will be deemed personal advice to one who
was virtually the sole shareholder."
In addition to the problem of distinction of interests, there is a great
deal of uncertainty as to the requisite degree of necessity of the business trans-
action. It is well established that the existence of a single bona fide business
purpose will not prevent a redemption from being held a dividend equivalent."
For example, a general assertion of intention to strengthen the corporation's
credit position will ordinarily not suffice to defeat ordinary income treatment
of the distribution.84
 Some specific and identifiable exigency must be shown.
The kind of compelling need for credit improvement which will occasion capi-
tal gain treatment under section 302 (b) (1) is illustrated by Isaac C. Eberly. 85
In this case, Dun & Bradstreet had reduced the corporation's credit rating
from second to third class because the books of the corporation evidenced an
extremely unfavorable ratio of fixed assets to liquid assets, and a large debt
owed it by the taxpayer, who was virtually the sole shareholder. As a result, it
213 F.2c1 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Isaac C. Eberly, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1157 (1951).
78
 Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
77
 Snite v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949); John A. Decker, 32 T.C.
326 (1959).
78
 See, e.g., Tabery v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United States
v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958).
79
 Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1957). But see Harry F. Cornwall, 48
T.C. 72 (1967), in which relinquishment of an original plan of the taxpayer for total
withdrawal from the corporation was deemed to indicate nondividend equivalence of the
redemption of a part of the taxpayer's interest, and United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d
531 (8th Cir. 1961), in which the voluntary withdrawal of a shareholder who could no
longer manage the business was itself deemed a business purpose of the corporation.
80 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); Genevra
Heman, 32 T.C. 479 (1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960).
Cir. 1960).
81
 See Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C.
723 (1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
82
 Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1964).
83
 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 1962); United
States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1958).
84
 See, e.g., Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958).
85
 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1157 (1951).
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was difficult for the company to obtain credit from suppliers; personal guaran-
tees were required on all orders. Dun & Bradstreet refused to reinstate the
company at the second class level of credit until the debt of the taxpayer was
reduced by half. The taxpayer, who previously had resisted having his stock
redeemed in cancellation of the debt, reluctantly agreed to a redemption to
the extent of 50 percent of the debt. The court held the distribution not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend, notwithstanding that there was no "immedi-
ate" need for credit improvement due to war shortages. 86 The necessity of
available credit at the end of the war and the uncertainty as to when that
need might arise was deemed sufficient.
Given the fact that there must be some concrete necessity to the business
purpose alleged, the question remains as to the degree of necessity required.
Some courts have taken the position that a redemption must be the "only
solution to some urgent corporate problem." 87 In such a jurisdiction, any
conceivable alternative to a distribution of earnings and profits may be seized
upon by the court to defeat capital gain treatment of the distribution. The test
applied by these courts is whether the purpose could have been achieved
without the distribution of earnings and profits. 88 This view seems overly
restrictive. Most courts require that the purpose be "compelling," 86 "con-
spicuous,"6° "the motivating force" 91 or "material and substantial." 62 In
hypothesizing alternatives to the distribution, such courts have been satisfied
that the redemption was the most feasible and satisfactory course of action
from a business standpoint .° This would seem the more appropriate approach
to the determination of whether the transaction served a valid necessary busi-
ness purpose, i.e., was an arm's-length sale or exchange occasioning capital
gain taxation to the shareholder.
In evaluating a corporate purpose, as with the consideration of significant
modification of shareholder interests, it is essential to adopt an approach which
views the total transaction involved. This is perhaps most evident in cases
relying on acquisition of new capital to overcome dividend equivalence. Acqui-
sition of new capital as a qualifying business purpose can arise in two con-
texts: Where the stock is redeemed .so that it may be resold by the corporation
to others in order to acquire new capital; and where the stock is redeemed
pursuant to the terms of its issuance, if the issuance itself was effected to
acquire new capital for a compelling business purpose. In both of these
instances, recognition of the business purpose served necessarily depends on
consideration of the transaction as a whole, including the subsequent sales
or original issuance, and not of the redemption as an isolated activity.
86 Id. at 1165.
87 Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir. 1966). See generally
Golden, The Dividend Equivalence Test: Forty Years of Confusion, 43 Texas L. Rev.
755, 767-69 (1965).
88 Golden, supra note 87, at 768.
89 E.g., Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962).
so E.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1962).
91 E.g., Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C. 723, 731 (1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
92 E.g., Heman v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1960).
93 See, e.g., Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275, 280 (10th Cir. 1964); John A.
Decker, 32 T.C. 326, 332 (1959).
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The case of Davis v. United States" is illustrative of this necessity of
viewing the total transaction. In this case the corporation sought to obtain a
loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The incorporators were
required to provide an additional $25,000 capital either by making a subor-
dinated loan to the company or by purchasing a new issue of preferred stock
or additional common stock. Reluctant to impair the corporation's financial
standing by placing a $25,000 debt on the corporate balance sheet, Davis
chose to purchase preferred stock in that amount. One condition of the pur-
chase was that the stock would be redeemed when the RFC loan was repaid.
At the time of the redemption Davis was the sole shareholder. In deciding
whether the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend, the court
posed the question whether there was, underlying the transaction, a legitimate
business purpose which was sufficiently compelling to overcome the fact that
the prorata nature of the redemption indicated dividend equivalence. Through
a series of rather involved mental steps, the court reached the correct result:
given the admittedly valid business purpose underlying the issuance of the
preferred stock, and given the agreement at the time of issuance to redeem
the stock when the RFC loan was repaid, the conclusion was apparent that
the redemption was "simply the final step taken in the completion of [the
original business] purpose."m Accordingly, the amount received by Davis
was treated as a distribution in part or full payment for the stock. Obviously,
if the prior aspect of the transaction, the issuance, had been ignored, this
redemption would incorrectly have been taxed at capital gain rates. For
proper determination of section 302 (b) (1) dividend equivalence, then, it is
essential that each redemption be considered in the context of the business
transaction of which it is part.
IV. CoNcLustoN
There are two fundamentally determinative criteria in the dividend
equivalence test: the prorata, or virtually prorata, nature of the distribution,
effecting no significant modification of proportionate ownership or control, and
the character of the redemption as a necessary business transaction. The very
existence of section 302 (b) (1) and the regulation indicating that the prorata
nature of the distribution is not alone determinative suggest that inquiry
into dividend equivalence should encompass more than a mathematical calcu-
lation of the degree of change in proportionate holdings. It has been the pur-
pose of this comment to suggest that involvement in a necessary business
transaction is the sole valid consideration beyond modification of shareholder
interests.
Professor Herwitz has stated that "the plain fact is that there is rarely
any corporate purpose served by a redemption transaction."96
 While this may
be true, it would be less universally so if transactions were considered in their
totality as suggested herein. Almost always, it is activities related to the
redemption (e.g., resale to acquire new capital, distribution of the redeemed
stock to employees, extension of previously unavailable credit to the corpora-
94 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
05
 Id. at 471.
96 D. Henvitz, supra note 71, at 480.
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tion) which give it its character of a necessary business transaction. Perhaps
courts could more easily view the corporate purpose in perspective if their
consideration of the factors in the dividend equivalence test were serial rather
than aggregate; it should first be determined whether the redemption is "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" on the basis of alteration of shareholder
interests in the corporation, and, if not, attention should be directed to any
alleged business purpose, evaluating its validity, necessity and total effect.
Such a step-by-step determination would permit the court to focus more
clearly upon each relevant factor, and to appreciate more fully the fundamen-
tally determinative criteria of change of proportionate ownership and involve-
ment in a necessary business transaction. It is submitted that the procedure
suggested herein would best effectuate the legislative intent of taxing at capital
gain rates any distribution in redemption which may properly be characterized
as a valid arm's-Iength exchange between shareholders and the corporation.
MARY ALICE STEPHENS
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